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I. INTRODUCTION
Under present North Carolina law, a defendant convicted of
first degree murder may be punished by execution.1 Together with
our state's decision to impose the death penalty goes an enhanced
responsibility on the state to ensure that death penalty defen-
dants' constitutional rights are meticulously preserved. Justifica-
tion for this enhanced responsibility in death penalty litigation is
abundant in both state and federal jurisdictions. For example, in
1. See N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 2 which provides:
The object of punishments being not only to satisfy justice, but also to
reform the offender and thus prevent crime, murder ... may be punish-
able with death, if the General Assemble shall so enact
See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1981) which provides:
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait,
imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliber-
ate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpe-
tration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense,
robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted
with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the
first degree, and any person who commits such murder shall be punished
with death or imprisonment in the State's prison for life as the court
shall determine pursuant to G.S. 15A-2000 ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1981) provides a series of mitigating and aggravating
factors which are to be considered by a jury when determining whether the death
penalty should be imposed. If the jury determines that the aggravating factors
substantially outweigh the mitigating factors then the jury is to recommend that
the death penalty be imposed. If the jury determines that the aggravating factors,
if any, do not substantially outweigh the mitigating factors then the jury is to
recommend life imprisonment.
[Vol. 8:71
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Woodson v. North Carolina,' the United States Supreme Court
noted:
[Tjhe penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence
of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more
from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from
one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference,
there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in
the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case."
Put another way, "the death penalty is the ultimate punishment.
It is irreversible, and once it has been exacted there is on this earth
neither parole nor pardon nor other corrective possibility. There-
fore, when death is a possible penalty, all constitutional safeguards
should be scrupulously observed."4
Regardless of the reader's view concerning the propriety of the
death penalty, the above-quoted passages possess much truth.
With North Carolinians heavily favoring the death penalty,5 and
executions in our state becoming more frequent in recent years,6
our obligation as lawyers and laypersons to ensure that the consti-
tutional rights of death penalty defendants are preserved is taking
on added significance. One practice which deserves close scrutiny is
prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges.
2. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3. Id. at 305 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
4. Keeton v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 (W.D.N.C.), rev'd on other
grounds, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984).
5. There are very few statistical studies indicating what percentages of North
Carolinians favor and oppose the death penalty. The University of North Carolina
School of Journalism periodically sponsors research on this issue through polling
procedures entitled The Carolina Poll. From February 17, 1984 to March 1, 1984,
The Carolina Poll conducted a random sampling of North Carolinians. One thou-
sand two hundred and nine (1,209) adults were contacted by telephone and asked,
among other things, "[d]o you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons con-
victed of murder?" The responses indicated that 65% of North Carolinians favor
the death penalty, 25% are opposed to it and 10% are undecided. A similar poll
conducted by The Carolina Poll in 1977 indicated that 57% of North Carolinians
favored the death penalty, 25% opposed it and 18% were undecided.
6. In 1984, North Carolina executed two death row inmates. On November 2,
1984, Margie Velma Barfield was executed for poisoning her fianc6. On March 16,
1984, James W. Hutchins was executed for murdering two law enforcement of-
ficers. The execution of Hutchins was the first execution in North Carolina since
the execution of Theodore Boykin in October 1961.
7. Every state and the federal government provide for some statutory method
1985]
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II. BACKGROUND
In North Carolina death penalty cases, both the prosecutor
and defense counsel are permitted fourteen peremptory chal-
lenges.8 "The peremptory [challenge] is employed by each party to
eliminate those individuals most likely to be hostile whose
prejudice cannot be proved to the judge's satisfaction. Extremes of
partiality, arising from any source counsel can discern, are thus re-
moved by the challenge process."' Blackstone described the pe-
remptory challenge as "an arbitrary and capricious species of chal-
lenge . . . [exercised] without showing any cause at all. ' ' 0
However, the purpose of the peremptory challenge is most notably
described as an attempt "to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try
the case before the court."' "
The purpose of the peremptory challenge-creation of a fair
and impartial jury-is indeed salutary. However, the underlying
premise that the peremptory challenge is used only for this pur-
pose is nothing less than a myth. Prosecutors often use peremptory
challenges to create death penalty juries composed entirely of per-
sons who favor execution.12 Prosecutorial use of the peremptory
of peremptory challenge. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UN-
CERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE JuRIEs 281-84 (1977) (Appendix D).
However, there has never been a constitutional right to provide for the peremp-
tory challenge. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Stilson v. United States,
250 U.S. 583 (1919). Presumably, therefore, a state could eliminate peremptory
challenges and not violate the United States Constitution.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217 (1977), entitled Number of Peremptory Chal-
lenges, provides:
(a) Capital cases.
(1) Each defendant is allowed 14 challenges.
(2) The State is allowed 14 challenges for each defendant.
(b) Noncapital cases.
(1) Each defendant is allowed six challenges.
(2) The State is allowed six challenges for each defendant.
(c) Each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge for each alternate
juror in addition to any unused challenges.
9. Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning of Jury Representation,
89 YALE L.J. 1177, 1180 (1980).
10. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (15th ed. 1809).
11. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965).
12. To some extent this statement is ipse dixit. Authors are unusually reluc-
tant to state unequivocally that prosecutors abuse peremptory challenges. For ex-
ample, Professor Winnick, in his article entitled Prosecutorial Peremptory Chal-
lenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional
Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1982), notes that "[miany criminal defense attor-
[Vol. 8:71
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challenge in this manner presents very serious constitutional and
ethical concerns: the constitutional right to a fair and impartial
jury;13 the constitutional right to be tried by a jury drawn from a
representative cross-section of the community;" the constitutional
right to be tried by a group of individuals capable of performing
the purpose and function of a jury;" the constitutional right not to
be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment; 6 and the profes-
sional responsibility of prosecutors7 to refrain from using peremp-
tory challenges to intentionally create juries biased in the state's
favor.
A. Swain v. Alabama
The most comprehensive discussion by the United States Su-
preme Court of the peremptory challenge occurred in Swain v. Al-
abama"5 where the Court acknowledged that the challenge is sub-
ject to prosecutorial abuse.19 Swain involved the indictment and
neys believe that prosecutors seek to prevent persons who are generally or even
vaguely opposed to the death penalty from serving on capital juries." Id. at 5.
Such statements, although suggesting that prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory
challenge might exist, fail to unequivocally state that abuse occurs. Based on in-
terviews with several respected North Carolina criminal law attorneys, in addition
to working on death penalty appeals in which the prosecutor obviously was abus-
ing peremptory challenges, this author is convinced that some prosecutors ac-
tively abuse peremptory challenges to obtain juries composed entirely of persons
favoring the death penalty in hopes that such a jury will be partial to the state
and more likely to both convict the defendant and to recommend the defendant's
execution.
13. See infra notes 40-105 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 106-62 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 163-80 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 181-220 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 221-38 and accompanying text.
18. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Swain has been one of the Court's more controver-
sial decisions. See, e.g., Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases; The
Negro Defendant and His Peerless Jury, 4 Hous. L Rv. 448 (1966); Note, Racial
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 41 ALB. L Rav. 623 (1977); Note, The Jury: A
Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 HASTINGS LJ. 1417 (1969);
Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on
the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157 (1967); Note, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitu-
tional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REv. 1157
(1966); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on
Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977); Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75
YALE L.J. 322 (1965).
19. At least one author has suggested that the Supreme Court has indirectly
acknowledged that prosecutors abuse peremptory challenges through its proposed
1985]
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conviction of a black man for the crime of rape. The defendant
moved that the trial court set aside the jury that was selected be-
cause the prosecutor systematically had struck all black persons
within the jury pool. The defendant's motion was denied and sub-
sequently he was sentenced to death.
The defendant in Swain made unsuccessful timely appeals
within the Alabama court system asserting a violation of his four-
teenth amendment equal protection rights. The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to decide these contentions.2 0 The
defendant's equal protection contention was essentially twofold:
first, that the prosecutor's systematic removal of all black jurors
from the jury pool was a violation of the defendant's equal protec-
tion rights; second; that as a result of deliberate and systematic
actions of prosecutors over a substantial number of years,2 1 no
black person had ever sat on a petit jury in either a criminal or
civil case in the defendant's county. "This [latter] systematic prac-
tice, [the defendant] claimed, [was] invidious discrimination for
which the peremptory system [was] insufficient justification."2
reform of peremptory challenge use in the federal courts. See Note, The Defend-
ant's Right to Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92
HA'v. L. REv. 1770 (1979). "[The] . . . proposal by the Supreme Court, which
almost became law, would have amended Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
24(b) to reduce the number of peremptory challenges available to both prosecu-
tors and defendants." Id. at 1774. The Supreme Court's proposed Rule 24(b)
would have altered the existing rule as follows:
Prosecutor Defendant
Present Proposed Present Proposed
Capital Crimes 20 12 20 12
Felonies 6 5 10 5
Misdemeanors 3 2 3 2
Id. at 1775 n.37.
20. 377 U.S. 915 (1964).
21. Mr. Justice Goldberg, dissenting in Swain, articulated the defendant's of-
fer of proof as follows:
Petitioner, a 19-year-old Negro, was indicted in Talladega County for the
rape of a 17-year-old white girl, found guilty, and sentenced to death by
an all-white jury. The petitioner established by competent evidence and
without contradiction that not only was there no Negro on the jury that
convicted and sentenced him, but also that no Negro within the memory
of persons now living has ever served on any petit jury in any civil or
criminal case tried in Talladega County, Alabama. Yet, of the group des-
ignated by Alabama as generally eligible for jury service in that county,
74% (12,125) were white and 26% (4,281) were Negro.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 231-32 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 223.
[Vol. 8:71
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The Supreme Court denied the defendant relief on each of his
claims. The Court was unwilling to analyze the removal of all black
persons from a petit jury in any particular case. The Court's rea-
soning was based on the fact that peremptory challenges are exer-
cised for a variety of reasons. If all black persons are peremptorily
challenged by the prosecutor in a particular case, this could be the
end product of the prosecutor's legitimate use of the challenge for
reasons wholly unrelated to these juror's race. In short, that all
black persons were peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor in
Swain did not mean that they were challenged merely because
they were black. "The presumption in any particular case must be
that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair
and impartial jury to try the case before the court. '23
The Swain defendant's second contention, that no black per-
son had ever been seated on a petit jury in his county, was not
dealt with in such a summary fashion by the Court. In light of this
additional allegation, the Court reasoned that the defendant's
"Fourteenth Amendment claim [took] on added significance. '24
In these circumstances, giving even the widest leeway to opera-
tion of irrational but trial-related suspicions and antagonisms, it
would appear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are
being perverted. If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Ne-
gro on any jury in a criminal case, the presumption protecting the
prosecutor may well be overcome. Such proof might support a
reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for
reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on
trial and that the peremptory system is being used to deny the
Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the ad-
ministration of justice enjoyed by the white population. These
ends the peremptory challenge is not designed to facilitate or
justify.25
Despite the defendant's extensive evidentiary showing, the Su-
preme Court denied him relief. His proof failed in one major as-
pect. The evidence showing that no black person had ever served
on a petit jury in the defendant's county failed to establish that
this nonrepresentation was a result of only the prosecution's ac-
tions. The nonrepresentation could conceivably have been caused
by challenges for cause, excusals, peremptory challenges by the de-
23. Id. at 222.
24. Id. at 223.
25. Id. at 223-24.
1985]
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fendant or an agreement between the prosecution and the defense
attorney that no black persons would sit on the jury.26 Removal of
black persons in any of these ways, the Court reasoned, would ne-
gate an equal protection claim. Therefore, the defendant's failure
to establish that nonrepresentation of black persons in his county
resulted exclusively, or even in majority, from prosecutorial abuse
of the peremptory challenge rendered the defendant's proof insuffi-
cient to sustain his second equal protection contention.
B. An Insurmountable Burden of Proof
In the nearly two decades since Swain, the decision has not
only been met with overwhelming criticism from legal academia,2
but also has resulted in substantial dissension among the Supreme
Court Justices.28 For example, in McCray v. New York,2 9 a rela-
tively recent case seeking a writ of certiorari from the Supreme
Court,
five Justices indicated their view that a discriminatory exercise of
prosecutorial peremptories should not be considered beyond judi-
cial scrutiny. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dis-
sented from the denial of certiorari, on the ground that "Swain
was decided before this Court held that the Sixth Amendment
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment ...
and . .. should be reconsidered in light of Sixth Amendment
principles established by our recent cases.". . . Three Justices, in
an opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Powell, stated that they did not disagree with Justice Marshall's
assessment of the importance of the issue. Rather, they voted to
deny certiorari on the ground that "further consideration of the
substantive and procedural ramifications of the problem by other
courts will enable us to deal with the issue more widely at a later
date.""o
Thus, the great majority of Swain's criticism, including that among
26. Id. at 224-25.
27. See supra note 18 and authorities cited therein.
28. See, e.g., McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983) (denial of certio-
rari). Justice Marshall, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in McCray, noted
that "[i]n the nearly two decades since it was decided, Swain has been the subject
of almost universal and often scathing criticism." Id. at 2440 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting; footnote omitted).
29. 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983) (denial of certiorari).
30. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
[Vol. 8:71
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the Court itself, has resulted from the virtually insurmountable
burden of proving that "in all cases, in all circumstances, whoever
the victim, whoever the defendant, blacks were excused from juries
without cause.' With but a mere two exceptions, 2 the Swain
burden of proof has never been satisfied.33
In an effort to circumvent the stringent Swain burden of proof
mandates, several state courts have held prosecutorial abuse of pe-
remptory challenges to exclude black persons impermissible under
their state constitutions." The rules governing peremptory chal-
lenges which these state courts have created, although having a few
differences, are basically identical. The Swain presumption that
the prosecution is properly using peremptory challenges remains
intact. If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of
prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge to the trial court,
the presumption ceases and the burden of proof shifts to the pros-
ecution to justify its use of peremptory challenges for legitimate
reasons. Should the prosecution fail to respond, or fail to suffi-
ciently justify its use of peremptory challenges, 5 the entire jury
31. Id. at 6983.
32. State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979); State v. Brown, 371 So.
2d 751 (La. 1979). Brown and Washington each involved situations where the
prosecutors openly admitted they had intentionally and systematically used their
peremptory challenges to exclude potential black jurors.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976) (defendant showed that during 1974, in 15 cases involv-
ing black defendants, 70 blacks were potential jurors and prosecutor peremptorily
challenged 57 of the blacks. In the defendant's case, all five black potential jurors
were peremptorily challenged by the prosecution. Equal protection argument re-
jected.); United States v. Danzey, 476 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd mem.,
620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 878 (1980) (Four black persons pe-
remptorily challenged by state. Prosecutor explained to trial court that "I make it
a practice to attempt to exclude as best I can all jurors ... of the same ethnic
background as the defendant." Id. at 1066). North Carolina adheres to the Swain
standard and has invariably denied appeals alleging prosecutorial abuse of the
peremptory challenge to exclude potential black jurors. See State v. Lynch, 300
N.C. 534, 268 S.E.2d 161 (1980); State v. Smith, 291 N.C. 505, 231 S.E.2d 663
(1977); State v. Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 222 S.E.2d 222 (1976).
34. See State v. Neil, 53 U.S.L.W. 2200 (Fla. Sept. 27, 1984); Commonwealth
v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); Peo-
ple v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); State v.
Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716; (Ct. App. 1980). See also People v. Payne,
106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982), rev'd, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d
1202. (1983).
35. The prosecution's justification for its use of the peremptory challenges
need not rise to the level necessary to sustain a challenge for cause.
1985]
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pool is excused, a new pool drawn and the jury selection process
started anew. This modified method of using peremptory chal-
lenges has apparently met with success."
III. THE ISSUES
Although without question the most frequently litigated pe-
remptory challenge issue concerns its use by prosecutors to exclude
all, or a large percentage, of potential black jurors, the peremptory
challenge is also subject to abuse concerning groups other than ra-
cial ones. For example, in People v. Kagan,37 although the defend-
ant was held to have not satisfied his prima facie burden of prov-
ing prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges, the court noted
that the prosecution could not use peremptory challenges to excuse
Jewish persons merely because they were Jewish. In Common-
wealth v. Reid,38 prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges to
exclude members of the male sex was determined to be impermiss-
sible. More recently, courts have begun to examine whether, in
death penalty cases, the prosecution may use peremptory chal-
lenges to remove all potential jurors indicting some hesitancy con-
cerning the wisdom of the death penalty, thereby creating a jury
composed entirely of persons who favor execution.39 Prosecutorial
36. In McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d at 1132-33 at 7009-10, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals commented:
[In states that have rules that the prosecution's use of its peremptory
challenges is subject to scrutiny under the state constitution, we have
seen no indication in the reported authorities or the commentaries that
the implementation of such scrutiny as has been required has created an
undue burden for the prosecution or the courts. In People v. Hall, the
California Supreme Court declined an invitation to overrule its five-year-
old decision in Wheeler, stating that it had no empirical evidence that
the Wheeler procedures had proven unworkable. 672 P.2d at 859 & n.11.
And in the present case, the State advises us that in the two years be-
tween the decision of the New York Appellate Division in People v.
Thompson, holding that the racially discriminatory use of peremptories
by the prosecutor was invalid under the New York Constitution, and the
implicit overruling of the decision by the New York of Appeals in People
v. McCray, the Thompson rule did not create any practical problems
whatever.
37. 101 Misc. 2d 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1979).
38. 384 Mass. 247, 424 N.E.2d 495 (1981) (Trial court held to have authority
to prohibit prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges to exclude males).
39. See, e.g., Dobbert v. State, 409 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Dobbert v. Strickland, 718 F.2d 1518 (l1th Cir. 1983) (prosecutorial use of pe-
remptory challenges to create juries composed entirely of persons favoring the
[Vol. 8:71
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use of peremptory challenges in this latter way raises some impor-
tant and troublesome constitutional concerns.
A. Right To A Fair And Impartial Jury
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution spe-
cifically provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed . .,40 The right to a fair and impartial jury is a fun-
damental right that is also protected by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.4 1 When a prosecutor uses peremptory
challenges to create death penalty juries composed entirely of per-
sons favoring execution, convictions and death sentences rendered
by such juries are arguably not impartial and therefore are in vio-
lation of the Constitution.
1. Conviction Impartiality
Although the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on
whether juries composed entirely of persons favoring execution are
impartial concerning conviction, the Court was faced with the issue
in Witherspoon v. Illinois.42 In support of his contention that the
jury which tried him was not impartial because it was composed
entirely of persons favoring the death penalty, the petitioner in
Witherspoon offered three incomplete sociological studies.4'3 How-
ever, the Court found that the studies were "too tentative and
death penalty held constitutionally permissible).
40. U.S. CONST. amend VI (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (failure of trial court to
grant motion for change of venue in wake of substantial pretrial publicity violated
the defendant's fourteenth amendment due process right to impartial jury). See
also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) ("In essence, the right to jury trial
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indiffer-
ent' jurors.").
42. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
43. The defendant in Witherspoon failed to offer evidence to the trial court
on this issue. Instead, the defendant requested that the Supreme Court take judi-
cial notice of the studies. Specifically, the Court was referred to: (1) H. Zeisel,
Some Insights into the Operation of Criminal Juries (Nov. 1957) (confidential
first draft, University of Chicago); (2) W. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment
and Jury Performance (1984) (unpublished manuscript, University of Texas); and
(3) F. Goldberg, Attitude Toward Capital Punishment and Behavior as a Juror
in Simulated Cases (undated) (unpublished manuscript, Morehouse College).
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fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death pen-
alty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt."
As a result, the Court was left to "speculate . . . as to the precise
meaning of the terms used in the studies, the accuracy of the tech-
niques employed, and the validity of the generalizations made." 41
Accordingly, the defendant's contentions relating to the conviction
partiality of the jury were denied.
In the years following Witherspoon, the three studies
presented to the Court by the petitioner have been refined. In ad-
dition, several new studies have been conducted. 4 These studies
provide valuable data which indicate that persons who favor the
death penalty, and therefore juries composed entirely of those per-
sons, are not impartial concerning conviction in death penalty
cases.
a. Zeisel Study
Since Witherspoon, the Zeisel study has been refined and pub-
lished. 7 Although data gathered for the Zeisel study were collected
prior to Witherspoon, the study remains highly significant because
it used actual jurors as subjects rather than making use of
simulations."
During 1954 and 1955, jurors in Chicago and Brooklyn were
interviewed following their last day of jury service. 49 The jurors
44. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517.
45. Id. at 517 n.11.
46. The studies described herein are merely representative and are not ex-
haustive. For a more thorough analysis of these and other sociological studies con-
cerning jury impartiality see 8 LAw AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (June 1984).
47. Zeisel, Some Data on Juror Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment,
Monograph (1968).
48. The Zeisel study was conducted by one of the leaders in forensic so-
cial science in this nation. Dr. Zeisel has been Professor of Law and Soci-
ology at the University of Chicago since 1952. He is the co-author with
Harry Kalven, Jr., of THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). His work has been
cited by the U.S. Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court and
others. Since his study used actual jurors it avoids some of the arguments
(most unfounded) directed at the unreliability of simulations. So his
work demonstrates that the significant differences between the convic-
tion behavior of scrupled and nonscrupled jurors are not limited to simu-
lated situations.
Grisby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1296 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd, No. 83-2113, slip
op. (8th Cir. Jan. 30, 1985).
49. Jurors had been advised of the study by the Clerk of Court, the inter-
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were asked: 1) whether they had scruples against the death pen-
alty; 2) whether they had sat on a jury that actually had deliber-
ated in a criminal case or cases; 3) if so, how they voted on the first
ballot; and 4) what was the vote of the entire panel of twelve on
the first ballot. Zeisel disregarded unanimous first ballot votes as
those would not indicate potential juror differences. There re-
mained 464 first ballot split votes to analyze. These were divided
into eleven "constellations" ranging from one vote "guilty" and
eleven votes "not guilty," to eleven votes "guilty" and one vote
"not guilty."
Zeisel found that in nine of the eleven "constellations," jurors
without scruples against the death penalty voted to convict more
often than jurors with scruples. Furthermore, in ten of the eleven
"constellations," jurors with scruples against the death penalty
voted to acquit more often than jurors without such scruples. 0
Professor Zeisel has testified that "[w]hatever the case is, if there
is a split ballot, my statement is [that] jurors who have scruples
against the death penalty as a group will have a lower percentage
of guilt votes than jurors [who] have no scruples." 51
b. Wilson Study
"The Wilson study was one of the first to show that persons
without scruples against the death penalty are more likely to con-
vict than people with such scruples. It also showed that non-scru-
pled jurors . . . appeared more biased in favor of the prosecu-
tion. '5 2 The Wilson study utilized sixty-one New York students
and 187 University of Texas students. These students were given
simulated fact descriptions of five criminal cases. On the basis of
the facts, each student was asked, if he were a juror, whether he
would find the defendant innocent or guilty. Wilson first indexed
the tendency of each student to convict by the number of guilty
responses the student gave to the hypothetical fact situations. This
index was then compared to whether the student had conscientious
views were anonymous, and two-thirds of the jurors contacted agreed to partici-
pate. Jurors were drawn from criminal felony trials without regard to the severity
of the crime.
50. The Zeisel study is presented in greater detail in Grisby v. Mabry, 569 F.
Supp. 1273, and in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 128 (1980).
51. Hovey, 28 Cal. 3d at 30, 616 P.2d at 1317, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
52. Grisby, 569 F. Supp. at 1295.
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scruples against the death penalty.
Wilson found that a majority of both groups voted guilty on
three of four occasions. However, 22 percent of the subject/jurors
with conscientious scruples against the death penalty voted guilt
on two or less occasions, as compared to only 9 percent of the
subject/jurors without such scruples. At the other end of the spec-
trum, 30 percent of the jurors without conscientious scruples
against capital punishment voted guilt in five of six cases, as com-
pared to 17 percent of the jurors with such scruples. These results
were statistically significant; the "p" value was less than .02. 53
c. Goldberg Study
Since Witherspoon, the Goldberg study has been refined and
published. 4 Subjects used in this study were two hundred under-
graduate students from four colleges in Atlanta, Georgia. One hun-
dred of the students were white and attended predominantly white
colleges; the remaining one hundred students were black and at-
tended predominantly black colleges.
The experiment consisted of reading thumbnail descriptions of
sixteen capital murder trials. The trials varied in "their severity,
heinousness, justification, and the amount of evidence available."5 5
The race of the characters was revealed. After reading each case,
subjects made determinations of guilt on a four choice scale:
"guilty of first degree murder, guilty of a lesser crime, acquittal on
the grounds of insanity [or] acquittal for lack of evidence."5 ,
Where guilt was found, subjects then chose a sentence of death,
life imprisonment, any number of years in prison, or probation. Fi-
nally, subjects were asked to give a yes/no response to the ques-
tion: "Do you have conscientious scruples against the death pen-
alty?" as a measure of capital punishment sentiment.
Dr. [Goldberg]57 found that subject/jurors without conscien-
tious scruples against the death penalty voted "guilt" on some
crimes (i.e., first degree murder or a lesser offense) in 75 percent
of their votes, whereas subject/jurors with such scruples voted
53. Hovey, 28 Cal. 3d at 33, 616 P.2d at 1319, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
54. Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury
Bias, and Use of Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 H~Av.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 53 (1970).
55. Id. at 59.
56. Id. at 60.
57. Dr. Faye Goldberg is now Dr. Faye Girsh.
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guilty 69 percent. The 6 percent difference between the groups
was found to be marginally significant. (P = .08).58
"Dr. [Goldberg] concluded that her results 'do tend to corroborate
the trends found' in the studies by Dr. Zeisel and Dr. Wilson
"59
d. Jurow 1971 Study
The Jurow 1971 Study was conducted by Professor George Ju-
row, a lawyer and a psychologist, while serving on the faculty of
the City University of New York. This study is the first post-
Witherspoon controlled experiment on the relationship between
juror attitudes towards the death penalty and their propensity to
convict. The study has been published."0
A mock jury pool was composed of the first two hundred fifty
employees of an industrial plant who signed up on an application
which described the project and invited participation. The mock
jurors first completed questionnaires which collected demographic
data and measured their attitudes concerning the death penalty.
The subjects then listened to two audiotapes of simulated capital
murder trials.61 Scripts for each tape were prepared in order to bal-
ance the evidence equally between acquittal and conviction. The
scripts included opening statements, direct and cross-examination
of witnesses, closing arguments, and instructions to the jury. Sub-
jects were given time after each tape to decide upon a verdict and
to mark verdict ballots.
The testing instruments were compilations of questions devel-
oped by Professor Jurow, and questions drawn from existing scales
which had previously been tested for validity and reliability. Ini-
tially, the mock jurors' general attitudes were tested by asking
them to answer the following questions:
58. Hovey, 28 Cal. 3d at 32, 616 P.2d at 1317, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (footnote
added).
59. Id.
60. Jurow, New Data on The Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the
Guilt Determination Process, 84 HAnv. L. REv. 567 (1971).
61. Case I was a felony murder trial involving a liquor store robbery and
murder of the proprietor. Case II involved a narcotics addict charged with rob-
bing, raping, and murdering a college student in her home.
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Capital Punishment Attitude
Questionnaire (CPAQ), Part B, and
Percentage distribution of subjects
endorsing each alternative
Assume you are on a jury to determine the sentence for a
defendant who has already been convicted of a very serious crime.
If the law gives you a choice of death or life imprisonment or
some other penalty: (Circle only one)
Percentage
Choosing
10% 1. I could not vote for the death penalty
regardless of the facts and circumstances of
the case.
20% 2. There are some kinds of cases in which I
know I could not vote for the death penalty
even if the law allowed me to but others in
which I would be willing to consider voting
for it.
63% 3. I would consider all of the penalties provided
by the law and the facts and circumstances
of the particular case.
5% 4. I would usually vote for the death penalty in
a case where the law allows me to.
2% 5. I would always vote for the death penalty in
a case where the law allows me to.6 2
Professor Jurow next asked the particular subject to vote on
the defendant's innocence or guilt in each of the two cases
presented on audiotapes. The following results were obtained:
CPAQ-B Number Number Within-Group
Statement Voting Voting Majority
Endorsed Guilty Innocent Vote
CASE I
Class
1 7 14 33% Convict
2 12 30 29% Convict
3 59 73 45% Convict
4 10 1 91% Convict
5 4 1 80% Convict
62. Grisby, 569 F. Supp. at 1297.
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CPAQ-B Number Number Within-Group
Statement Voting Voting Majority
Endorsed Guilty Innocent Vote
CASE II
Class
1 9 12 43% Convict
2 12 30 60% Convict
3 76 56 57% Convict
4 9 2 82% Convict
5 4 1 80% Convict
Transferring these two charts 3 into bar graph form is helpful
in understanding the data as they relate to the effect of
prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges on jury impartiality
concerning conviction in death penalty cases.
CASE I CASE II
100-
90-
80-
70-
60-
50-
40-
30-
20-
10 -
5 4 3 2 1
CPAQ Response
5 4 3 2
CPAQ Response
CPAQ response 1 jurors are eliminated for cause under the
reasoning of Witherspoon." Category 5 jurors are eliminated for
cause because they are unable to render a sentence based on the
facts of a particular case. This leaves categories 2, 3 and 4 as the
persons eligible to sit on death penalty juries. When prosecutors
63. Id. These charts are not exact reproductions of those appearing in Grisby
but are accurate based on data contained therein.
64. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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use their peremptory challenges based on jurors' views on the
death penalty, they try to obtain a jury composed entirely of per-
sons falling into category 4. In both of Professor Jurow's simulated
cases, category 4 jurors showed a significantly higher propensity to
convict than jurors in categories 3 and 2. Jurow's study strongly
supports the contention that death penalty juries from which all
persons having any degree of scruples against the death penalty
have been removed are uncommonly willing to convict.
e. Bronson Colorado Study
In 1967, Professor Edward Bronson conducted a study com-
paring death penalty attitudes of Colorado jurors with those jurors'
propensity to convict. The results of this study confirm the find-
ings of Zeisel, Wilson, Goldberg and Jurow and have been
published."5
Professor Bronson secured jury lists from eight Colorado coun-
ties, which provided the names of 1,117 prospective jurors. Inter-
viewers contacted about half of these persons in person, the other
half by telephone. In all, 718 people participated in the survey.
The participant solicitation methods provided an essentially ran-
dom sample of subjects.
Capital punishment attitudes were measured by asking re-
spondents if they "strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose
capital punishment."" Conviction propensity was measured by
asking respondents if they agreed or disagreed with five
statements:
1. If the police have arrested an individual and the district at-
torney has brought him to trial, there is good reason to be-
lieve that the man on trial is guilty.
2. If the person on trial does not testify at his trial, there is good
reason to believe that he is concealing guilt.
3. Concerning the high level of violent crime in ghetto areas, this
level of violent crime could be reduced if the courts would
convict alleged law-breakers more often.
4. The courts are far too technical in protecting the so-called
constitutional rights of those involved in criminal activity.
5. The plea of insanity is a loophole allowing too many guilty
65. Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the
Death-Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1 (1970).
66. Id. at 8.
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men to go free."
The results of Professor Bronson's Colorado study are as
follow:
Death Penalty Attitude and Conviction Proneness (CP) 8
Percent Evincing Conviction Proneness
Death Penalty
Attitude Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Strongly Favor 30.9% 40.0% 91.5% 84.4% 91.1%
Favor 28.8 22.9 83.3 74.3 85.0
Oppose 20.3 25.1 75.3 64.3 76.6
Strongly Oppose 8.8 20.6 51.6 60.3 60.6
With the single exception of question two in the categories of
"favor" and "oppose," the more strongly the participants favored
the death penalty, the greater the percentage became who were
conviction prone. This study found that the "difference in convic-
tion proneness between those who favor and oppose the death pen-
alty . . is consistent, predictable and substantial."9
f. Bronson's California Studies
In 1981, Professor Bronson published a compilation of two
studies, each similar to his Colorado study, involving potential Cal-
ifornia jurors.7 0 The survey design and instruments used were re-
fined replications of those used by Bronson in his earlier Colorado
study.
i. Butte County Study
Butte County is a rural area in northeastern California. Jury
lists provided approximately 1,200 eligible jurors in this area. All
of these persons were telephoned and 755 agreed to participate in
the study. The survey instrument measured attitudes toward capi-
tal punishment by asking which of the following statements de-
scribed the respondent's feelings toward the death penalty:
1. I strongly favor it.
67. Id. at 7. Each statement infers conviction propensity from a juror's will-
ingness to ignore the constitutional and legal rights of defendants.
68. Id. at 8.
69. Id. at 31.
70. Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases Make
the Jury More Likely to Convict? Some Evidence From California, 3 WOODROW
WILSON L.J. 11 (1981).
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2. I favor it.
3. I oppose it.
4. I strongly oppose it.71
Conviction proneness attitudes were measured by agreement or
disagreement with the following statements:
1. If the police have arrested an individual and the district at-
torney has brought him to trial, there is good reason to be-
lieve that the man on trial is guilty.
2. A person is brought to trial on a criminal charge. If that indi-
vidual has personal knowledge of the crime but refuses to tes-
tify, there is good reason to believe that person is concealing
guilt.
3. The high level of violent crime in the ghetto could be reduced
if the courts would convict lawbreakers more often.
4. The courts are far too technical in protecting the so-called
constitutional rights of those involved in criminal activity.
5. The plea of insanity is a loophole allowing many guilty per-
sons to go free.
6. If the facts in a trial are not clear, then jurors should believe
the prosecuting attorney more often than the defense attor-
ney, since defense attorneys are only interested in protecting
their clients at all costs.
7. During a riot, the government should have absolute power to
jail suspicious persons without trial or bail.7 1
The results of the Bronson Butte County study are as follows:
Death Penalty Attitude and Conviction Proneness (CP)73
Percent Evincing Conviction Proneness
Death Penalty
Attitude Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Total
Strongly Favor 47% 65% 78% 86% 90% 28% 45% 63%
Favor 28 54 78 75 80 21 35 53
Oppose 28 33 53 55 62 19 19 28
Strongly Oppose 9 17 19 26 48 6 6 19
The data in this chart forms a consistent pattern: the more a
juror favors the death penalty, the more likely he is to be convic-
tion prone. Where the totals of all specific categories are calculated
and percentages obtained, these results are even clearer. Jurors
who "strongly favor" or "favor" the death penalty are substantially
71. Id. at 15.
72. Id. at 14-15.
73. Id. at 17.
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more conviction prone than jurors who "oppose" the death
penalty.
ii. Los Angeles, Sacramento & Stockton Studies
These studies were conducted after the Colorado and Butte
County studies. With only a few exceptions, the methodology re-
mained the same. Bronson obtained 707 participants: 414 from Los
Angeles; 235 from Sacramento; and 58 from Stockton. Participant
attitude towards the death penalty was gauged by participant re-
sponses to the same four categories used in the Butte County
study.74 Seven questions were asked to determine the participant's
conviction proneness. Questions 1, 3, 4 and 5 were the same as in
the Butte County study. Questions 2, 6 and 7 were modified as
follows:
2. A person is brought to trial on a criminal charge. If that indi-
vidual has personal knowledge of the crime but refuses to tes-
tify, that is a poor reason to believe that person is concealing
guilt.
6. If the facts in a trial are not clear, then jurors should believe
the defense attorney more often than the prosecutor, since
prosecutors are only interested in convicting defendants at all
costs.
7. It is better that ten guilty men go free than one innocent man
be convicted.7 5
The results of the California studies are as follows:
Death Penalty Attitude and Conviction Proneness (CP)76
Percent Evincing Conviction Proneness
Death Penalty
Attitude Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Total
Strongly Favor 31% 48% 78% 74% 81% 76% 38% 61%
Favor 19 39 60 51 65 80 39 50
Oppose 13 36 35 23 47 79 36 38
Strongly Oppose 8 38 19 9 26 74 25 29
This table indicates the relative conviction proneness of the
participants.
On question one, three, four and five, the comparisons are strik-
74. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
75. Bronson, supra note 70, at 24-25.
76. Id. at 26.
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ing. Only on the badly drafted question two, and on question six,
is the difference not great. Looking at the totals column, it can be
seen that those who strongly favor the death penalty gave re-
sponses 11% more conviction prone than those who merely fa-
vored it; those who favored the death penalty gave responses 12 %
more conviction prone than those who opposed it.77
Professor Bronson concludes from his California study that "[t]his
consistent stair-shaped pattern is characteristic of all the studies:
as opposition to the death penalty increases, conviction proneness
decreases." 8
Unlike the data available to the Witherspoon Court, sociologi-
cal studies concerning juror death penalty attitude and jury impar-
tiality are no longer "tentative and fragmentary."' 9 Although these
studies are not conclusive, they strongly suggest that juries void of
all persons having some hesitance concerning the wisdom of the
death penalty are not impartial. As a result, defendants subjected
to trial by such juries should be entitled to new trials.
2. Sentencing Impartiality
Prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges to obtain juries
composed entirely of persons favoring the death penalty, in addi-
tion to raising questions concerning conviction impartiality, also
raises questions concerning sentencing impartiality. Referring
again to Witherspoon v. Illinois,8" a case dealing with the relation-
ship between challenges for cause and juries composed entirely of
persons favoring the death penalty, a better understanding of sen-
tencing impartiality is possible. In Witherspoon, the Supreme
Court was faced with an Illinois statute permitting the prosecutors
in death penalty cases to challenge for cause "any juror who shall,
on being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples against
capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same."'" As a re-
sult, the prosecutor was allowed to empanel a jury composed en-
tirely of persons in favor of the death penalty-a practice the de-
fendant contended was in violation of his constitutional right to a
trial by a fair and impartial jury.
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that his consti-
77. Id. at 25.
78. Id.
79. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517.
80. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
81. Id. at 512, quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959).
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tutional rights were violated by the Illinois law. "[It is self-evident
that, in its role as arbiter of the punishment to be imposed, this
jury fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner
was entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." ' 2 The
Court's major concern was the composition of the jury that sen-
tenced the defendant to death. "[W]hen [the State] swept from
the jury all who expressed conscientious or religious scruples
against capital punishment and all who opposed it in principle, the
State crossed the line of neutrality. In its quest for a jury capable
of imposing the death penalty, the State produced a jury uncom-
monly willing to condemn a man to die." 3
The Witherspoon Court determined that the defendant's
death sentence had to be reversed. In concluding its opinion, the
Court held that:
Whatever else might be said of capital punishment, it is at
least clear that its imposition by a hanging jury cannot be
squared with the Constitution. The State of Illinois has stacked
the deck against the petitioner. To execute this death sentence
would deprive him of his life without due process of law."
3. Analysis
Three arguments for rejecting the fair and impartial jury the-
ory can be offered. First, it can be argued that Witherspoon in-
volved challenges for cause as opposed to peremptory challenges
82. Id. at 518 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 520-21 (emphasis added & footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 523 (emphasis added). The test set forth by the Witherspoon Court
to determine whether a juror is properly excused for cause in a death penalty case
because of that juror's views on the death penalty is whether the juror states un-
equivocally that he is opposed to the death penalty or that because of his views
on the death penalty he could not render a fair and impartial verdict and/or sen-
tence. The Witherspoon test has recently been modified in Wainwright v. Witt,
105 S. Ct. 844 (1985). The new test for determining when a prospective juror in a
death penalty case may be excluded for cause because of his views on the death
penalty is whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath."
Id. at 852, quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980). Witherspoon viola-
tions have resulted in either of two remedies. First, the defendant's death sen-
tence is vacated and life imprisonment is substituted. See, e.g., Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38 (1980). The other option is to vacate the death sentence and remand
the case to the trial court for re-sentencing. North Carolina takes the latter ap-
proach. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(2) (1981).
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and is therefore distinguishable.8 5 However, this distinction does
not appear to be meaningful. If a jury composed entirely of persons
favoring the death penalty, created by virtue of a prosecutor's use
of challenges for cause, violates the Constitution by being a "hang-
ing jury"86 that is "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to
die ''s8 does the fact that the prosecutor "stacked the deck"88s in his
favor through systematic use of his peremptory challenges make
the jury eventually selected any more fair and impartial? Common
sense dictates that the answer to this question must be "no." Re-
gardless of whether a "hanging jury" is created by the prosecutor
through challenges for cause or through peremptory challenges, the
jury remains a "hanging jury."
A second argument that can be made is that the peremptory
challenge, by definition, and in order to retain its effectiveness, is
never subject to judicial review. 9 Several reasons suggest that this
argument has very little, if any, merit. First, Swain essentially said
that, given the proper circumstances, the peremptory challenge is
subject to judicial review and control.90 Second, it should be
remembered that Swain was decided on equal protection grounds.
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the role of peremptory chal-
lenges under the sixth amendment.91 However, a recent decision in
the federal court of appeals has held that the peremptory challenge
is reviewable under the sixth amendment.92 Finally, the peremp-
tory challenge is not a constitutional right,93 but rather, is a statu-
tory creation. One of the most fundamental principles of the
85. See, e.g., Dobbert v. State, 409 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Dobbert v. Strickland, 718 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1983); Capler v. State, 237 So. 2d
445 (Miss. 1970).
86. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523.
87. Id. at 521.
88. Id. at 523.
89. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820, 256 S.E.2d 907 (1979); Brice v.
State, 264 Md. 352, 286 A.2d 132 (1972). Although never having ruled on abuse of
peremptory challenges by prosecutors to create death penalty juries composed en-
tirely of persons favoring execution, North Carolina would appear to follow this
line of argument by virtue of its decisions on abuse of peremptory challenges in
the racial context. See supra note 33 and North Carolina cases cited therein.
90. Admittedly this was dictum.
91. Several members of the Court have expressed a desire to consider this
issue. See, e.g., McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438, and text accompanying note
30.
92. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113.
93. See supra note 7.
[Vol. 8:71
24
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss1/4
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
American criminal justice system is that when a statutory right,
such as the peremptory challenge, conflicts with a constitutional
right, such as the right to a fair and impartial trial, the latter must
prevail.94
Finally, it can be argued that the substantial proof require-
ments of Swain prevent relief for alleged prosecutorial abuse of
peremptory challenges in any single case.95 However, as with the
first two arguments, this too is unpersuasive. Several reasons sup-
port this contention. First, unlike the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the sixth amendment specifically pro-
vides for jury impartiality in "all criminal prosecutions."9 " There-
fore, the sixth amendment "protects each defendant who is to
stand trial, not simply the last in a sequence of defendants to suf-
fer the deprivation of an impartial jury."97 Accordingly, the sixth
amendment requires "the court to decide each case on the basis of
the acts or practices complained of in that very case, and not to
require the defendant to show, as Swain requires for an equal pro-
tection claim, that those acts or practices have had undesirable ef-
fects in case after case."9"
94. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Writing for the Court
in Marbury, Chief Justice John Marshall commented that "an act of the legisla-
ture, repugnant to the constitution, is void." Id. at 177.
If then, the courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitu-
tion is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution,
and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which both apply.
Those then who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to
be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity
of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and
see only the law.
Id. at 178. "This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written consti-
tutions. . . , that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void; and the courts...
are bound by that instrument." Id. at 178, 180 (emphasis original).
95. See, e.g. Dobbert v. State, 409 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Dobbert v. Strickland, 718 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1983). In the Dobbert cases the
defendant attempted to comply with the stringent proof requirements of Swain.
Research was conducted over several years which determined a pattern of
prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge to obtain death penalty juries
composed entirely of persons favoring execution. However, the research, con-
ducted by Professor Winnick, supra note 12, was deemed insufficient to meet the
Swain mandates. See also Brown v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 515, 184 S.E.2d 786,
vacated, 408 U.S. 940 (1971) (petitioner denied relief because his offer of proof
was limited to his own case thereby not satisfying the mandates of Swain).
96. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (emphasis added).
97. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1130.
98. Id. A defendant asserting jury impartiality need not demonstrate that he
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Second, the rationale in Swain for requiring substantial proof
of prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges does not exist re-
garding peremptory challenges and potential juror death penalty
attitudes. 9 A probable reason the Swain Court required an exten-
sive showing of proof to establish a violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights was the relationship between the alleged un-
constitutional motive underlying the prosecutor's use of the pe-
remptory challenge and the proof required to establish this motive.
A person's race, perhaps more notably in the context of white per-
sons and black persons, is a patent characteristic. If the prosecutor
intends to misuse his peremptory challenges to remove all black
persons from the jury, he does not have to ask the black jurors any
questions about their race. The only thing the prosecutor needs to
know is whether the juror is a black person and this can usually be
determined by sight alone. As a result, there is no record in the
voir dire questioning that reveals evidence of the prosecutor's un-
derlying motives. All that exists is the mere fact that all black per-
sons are peremptorily challenged by the prosecution and this, as
noted in Swain, might be the result of the prosecution's legitimate
use of its peremptory challenges for reasons other than race. By
requiring defendants to establish a pattern of prosecutorial abuse
of the peremptory challenge over a number of years, the existence
of the pattern provides substantial assurances, arguably not pre-
sent in the single case context, that the prosecution's purpose in
peremptorily challenging all black persons is racially, and therefore
unconstitutionally, motivated.
However, a person's view on the death penalty is a latent char-
acteristic. To identify this characteristic the prosecutor must nec-
essarily ask questions about the jurors' views on the death penalty.
As a result, the prosecutor creates a voir dire record indicating his
motive for eventually peremptorily challenging jurors based on
has actually been prejudiced. A denial of due process can result from circum-
stances creating the possibility for, or even the appearance of, a likelihood that
bias exists. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), overruled, Taylor v. Loui-
siana, 419 U.S 522, as stated in State v. Hobbs, 282 S.E.2d 258 (W. Va. 1981).
99. Professor Winnick, in his article, supra note 12, suggests that substantial
proof requirements are necessary. In fact, a majority of his study was centered on
demonstrating prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges over a number of
years. Although there is no question that such a showing would enhance the proof
of prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges, Professor Winnick is arguably
wrong about the need for substantial proof in the death-penalty-juror-attitude-
on-execution setting.
[Vol. 8:71
26
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss1/4
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
their views on the death penalty. Therefore, the substantial assur-
ances of prosecutorial misconduct found lacking in Swain are usu-
ally present in the death penalty view context thereby rendering
the substantial proof requirements of Swain virtually unnecessary.
Third, the Swain Court was concerned that the absence of
black persons on juries could have been the result of collusion be-
tween the prosecutor and the defense attorney.100 Partially because
of this uncertainty, the Court required extensive proof to establish
a constitutional violation. In relation to juror attitudes on the
death penalty, there is no realistic possibility of a collusive effort
between the prosecutor and the defense attorney to remove all per-
sons indicating some hesitancy concerning the wisdom of the death
penalty. No defense attorney who represents a client faced with
the possibility of execution wants a jury composed entirely of per-
sons favoring execution.
Finally, assuming arguendo that the strict proof requirements
of Swain are applicable to sixth amendment analysis, relief may
still be possible under the North Carolina Constitution. As noted
earlier, l0 1 several states have circumvented Swain by resorting to
their respective constitutions. The North Carolina Constitution
provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall be convicted of
any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury in open court. 10 2
This constitutional provision has been interpreted by the North
Carolina Supreme Court as requiring that juries be impartial.10 3
Additionally, in State v. Honeycutt,'0 the court noted that "both
the State and the defendant are entitled to a trial by an impartial
jury." 10 Therefore, relief is possible under the North Carolina
Constitution for prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges to
create death penalty juries composed entirely of persons favoring
execution.
B. Representative Cross-Section
A second constitutional concern relating to prosecutorial abuse
of peremptory challenges to create death penalty juries composed
100. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 34, cases cited therein and accompanying text.
102. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24.
103. State v. Dalton, 206 N.C. 507, 174 S.E. 422 (1934).
104. 285 N.C. 174, 203 S.E.2d 844 (1974), vacated in part, 418 U.S. 903
(1976).
105. Id. at 179, 203 S.E.2d at 848.
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entirely of persons favoring execution is the effect of that abuse on
a defendant's constitutional right to be tried by a jury drawn from
a representative cross-section of the community."' 6 The require-
ment that juries in criminal cases be drawn from a representative
cross-section of the community stems from the sixth and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution as applied
by numerous Supreme Court decisions. For example, in Taylor v.
Louisiana,'0 7 the Supreme Court specifically held that the "Ameri-
can concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community"' 08 and that the fair cross-section
requirement is "fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the
sixth amendment."' 0 9 In explaining its decision, the Taylor Court
commented:
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power-to make available commonsense judgement of the com-
munity as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor
and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned
or biased response of a judge. This prophylactic vehicle is not
provided if the jury pool is made up of only segments of the pop-
ulace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool.
Community participation in the administration of the criminal
law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage
but is also critical to public confidence in the system. Restricting
jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable seg-
ments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared
with the constitutional concept of jury trial.1'0
106. The Supreme Court has never applied cross-section analysis to the per-
emptory challenge, juror-death-penalty-attitude setting.
107. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The Taylor holding was set squarely on sixth
amendment grounds. However, the decision was influenced in large part by a se-
ries of other Supreme Court cases decided on grounds other than the sixth
amendment which had long recognized a constitutional fair cross-section require-
ment. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), overruled, Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 422 (1975) (due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Thiel v.
Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (exercise of Court's supervisory powers
over trials in federal courts); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (equal
protection clause of fourteenth amendment). See also Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S.
128, 130 (1940) ("It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as
instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the
community.").
108. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527.
109. Id. at 530.
110. Id. (citation omitted).
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Thus, central to the fair cross-section requirement are notions of a
jury's historic purpose and its use as a vehicle for public input and
support for the criminal justice system.
Four years after Taylor, in Duren v. Missouri,"' the Supreme
Court established a three-part test to determine whether defen-
dants asserting a cross-section claim have established a prima facie
violation of the sixth amendment.
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-
section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group
alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community;
(2) that the representation of this group in the venires from which
juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the
number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under-
respresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
jury-selection process.1 2
If a defendant is successful in establishing a prima facie case,
the burden of proof shifts to the state to justify its systematic ex-
clusion of the distinctive group "by showing attainment of a fair
cross-section to be incompatible with a significant state inter-
est.""' 3 The defendant's right to a properly constituted jury cannot
be overcome "on merely rational grounds.""' Rather, the signifi-
cant state interest must be "manifestly and primarily advanced by
those aspects of the jury selection process . ..that result in the
disproportionate exclusion of [the] distinctive group.""15
1. Application of Duren
a. Distinct Group
The first prong of the Duren test requires that the group alleg-
edly excluded be a "distinctive group in the community."" 6 The
term "distinctive group" includes "economic, social, religious, ra-
cial, political, and geographical groups.""17 Dissenting in Thiel v.
Southern Pacific Co.," 8 Mr. Justice Frankfurter articulated the
test of whether a group is distinct as whether the persons excluded
111. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
112. Id. at 364.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534.
115. Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68.
116. Id. at 364.
117. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217-24 (1946).
118. Id.
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"have a different outlook psychologically and economically,"
whether they "adopt a different sense of justice, and a different
conception of a juror's responsibility.' 1 9 Other formulations of the
test include: whether those excluded would "act otherwise than
those who were drawn would act,"'10 whether those excluded com-
prise "any large and identifiable segment of the community,''
and whether the group excluded is "sufficiently numerous and
distinct. 122
Applying these definitions concerning what constitutes a "dis-
tinct" group to the group of persons excluded peremptorily by
prosecutors attempting to create a death penalty jury composed
entirely of persons favoring execution, the first prong of the Duren
test is almost certainly satisfied. 23 This conclusion is supported by
several sociological studies, many of which have been summarized
herein,' 2 which strongly suggest that persons having doubts about
the death penalty possess markedly different views and attitudes
concerning relevant aspects of criminal litigation than persons
favoring the death penalty. These studies consistently indicate
that the group of persons targeted by prosecutors for peremptory
119. Id. at 230 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
120. Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 640 (1906).
121. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1975), overruled, Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
122. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975) (In determining that
women comprised a cognized class, the Court partially relied on empirical data
indicating that women provided different "perspectives and values" to juries than
men did). Professor Winnick has summarized the various tests of group distinc-
tiveness as follows:
Clearly, to be cognizable, a group must be identifiable in some objective
sense. As one lower court put it, such a group must have a "definite com-
position," i.e., there must be "some factor which defines and limits the
group." A cognizable group is not one "whose membership shifts from
day to day or whose members can be arbitrarily selected." In addition,
the group must have "cohesion" - there must be a "common thread
which runs through the group, a basic similarity in attitudes or ideas or
experience." Another court has termed this "unifying viewpoint," a re-
quirement that members of the group share "a common perspective aris-
ing from their life experience in the group, i.e., a perspective gained pre-
cisely because they are members of that group ... a common social or
psychological outlook on human events."
Winnick, supra note 12, at 69 (footnotes omitted, emphasis original).
123. Contra, People v. Zimmerman, 36 Cal. 3d 154, 680 P.2d 776, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 826 (1984).
124. See supra notes 46-79 and accompanying text.
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excusal in death penalty cases has a shared "sense of justice," '25
"social outlook1126 and "conception of a juror's responsibility," '27
all of which differ from the attitudes of persons favoring the death
penalty. As one commentator has put it, "[t]hese studies provide
consistent and impressive support for the conclusion that death
penalty objectors are additionally distinct from nonobjectors, and
therefore meet the 'common thread' [or 'distinct'] requirement.' 28
Satisfaction of the "distinct group" requirement is also sup-
ported by analyzing litigation concerning Witherspoon'29 and chal-
lenges for cause. The issue in these cases is whether the exclusion
of jurors in death penalty cases who state unequivocally that they
are opposed to the death penalty results in a violation of the de-
fendant's fair cross-section rights. At least one court has denied
this claim' 30 reasoning that the viewpoints of the excluded group
were adequately represented by those jurors who were less strenu-
ously opposed to execution and therefore not subject to excusal for
cause.' 31 Systematic removal of the latter group through
prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges entirely undercuts
this rationale. "If both groups are eliminated, there is no logical
group to represent the large and distinct segment of the commu-
nity that oppose the death penalty.' 32
b. Representation Not Fair And Reasonable
The second prong of the Duren test requires the defendant to
show that representation of the excluded group "in the venires
125. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 230 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Winnick, supra note 12, at 72.
129. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
130. Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1385 (E.D. Ark.), modified on
other grounds, 637 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980).
131. This reasoning is merely a reformulation of the test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Rawlins, supra note 120 and accompanying text. See also Ru-
bio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 97-98, 593 P.2d 595, 597-98, 154 Cal. Rptr.
734, 737 (1979) (requiring that no other members of the community are capable of
adequately representing the perspective of the group assertedly excluded).
132. Winnick, supra note 12, at 72. It is virtually unquestionable that per-
sons who favor execution do not represent the viewpoints and perspectives of per-
son who oppose execution. The overwhelming majority, if not totality, of sociolog-
ical research conducted on this issue supports this contention. See, e.g., supra
notes 46-79 and accompanying text.
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from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation
to the number of such, persons in the community.113 3 Without
question, the second prong of Duren speaks in terms of jury
venires or pools as opposed to the juries actually selected to hear
cases. Therefore, in order to apply cross-section requirements to
prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges, one of two argu-
ments must be accepted: Either the second prong of Duren must
be eliminated or it must be extended to juries actually selected.
i. Eliminating Duren's Second Prong
One method of "satisfying" the second prong of Duren is to
eliminate it from the test. In a recent case in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,13 4 the court held that
when prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges and a defend-
ant's cross-section rights intersect, the second prong of the Duren
test is not applicable and is therefore eliminated.
It is evident that the second factor stated by the Duren
Court, i.e., that the resulting group was in fact not representative
of the community, is not applicable to the petit jury stage. We
conclude that in order to establish a prima facie violation of his
right to the possibility of a fair cross section in the petit jury, the
defendant must show that in his case, (1) the group alleged to be
excluded is a cognizable group in the community, and (2) there is
a substantial likelihood that the challenges leading to this exclu-
sion have been made on the basis of the individual venirepersons'
group affiliation rather than because of any indication of a possi-
ble inability to decide the case on the basis of the evidence
presented.115
133. Duren, 419 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added).
134. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
135. Id. at 1131-32. It should be carefully noted that by eliminating the sec-
ond prong of Duren, the result is not that the defendant is entitled to a jury of a
particular composition. Rather, the defendant's right is to be free from jeopardy
at the hands of a jury from which the state has systematically excluded a cogniza-
ble group or groups. The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that state
actions during the jury selection process which systematically eliminate jury
cross-section attributes of a jury pool result in the violation of a defendant's con-
stitutional cross-section rights.
The American tradition of trial by jury, ... necessarily contem-
plates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community
.. . This does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain repre-
sentatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geo-
graphical groups of the community; frequently such complete representa-
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ii. Extending Duren's Second Prong to Actual Juries
Perhaps more reasonable than entirely eliminating the second
prong of the Duren test when examining prosecutorial abuse of pe-
remptory challenges and constitutional cross-section rights is to
extend the second prong of the test to the juries which are actually
selected. Thus the Duren test could be modified to read as follows:
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-
section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group
alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community;
(2) that the representation of this group in the venires from
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to
the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in
the jury selection process.
Extending the second prong of the Duren test to actual juries
makes a certain amount of sense. "The purpose of the fair cross-
section mandate is the selection of representative juries, not
merely representative venires. '136 "The desired interaction of a
cross-section of the community does not occur [in the venire]; it is
only effectuated within the jury room itself. ' 137 It should not be
forgotten that an essential purpose of the jury is to interpose the
"commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the
overzealous or mistaken prosecutor . . . ."' This purpose is most
certainly not achieved "if the over-zealous prosecutor .. . can
eliminate the representative character of the jury through the jury
challenge system."' 13 9 As one court has put it,
the responsibility of the state and its prosecutor is not to secure a
conviction at all costs; it is to see that justice is done, and the
constitutional wisdom is that justice is best served by a jury that
tion would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall
be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion
of any of these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those
eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury
competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That
fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open
the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to
the democratic ideals of trial by jury.
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946).
136. Winnick, supra note 12, at 64.
137. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. at 482, 387 N.E.2d at 513.
138. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 530 (1975).
139. Winnick, supra note 12, at 64.
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represents a cross-section of the community, not one from which
cognizable groups have been systematically eliminated because of
their group affiliation.""
iii. Necessary Factual Showing
Assuming that the second prong of the Duren test is not elimi-
nated but is extended to actual juries, it is necessary to show that
the representation on the jury of the group of persons excluded by
prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge is not fair and rea-
sonable in relation to the number of such persons in the commu-
nity. 1 ' The most common method of proving a discrepancy be-
tween group representation on juries and group representation in
the community is through statistics."" Statistics concerning the at-
titude of North Carolinians on the death penalty are limited in
usefulness. One poll' 3 conducted in 1977 determined that 57% of
North Carolinians favored the death penalty, 25% opposed it and
18% were undecided. A more recent poll"4 conducted in 1984 de-
termined that 65% of North Carolinians favor the death penalty,
25% oppose it and 10% are undecided. These statistics, although
helpful, are too general to determine the specific size of the group
of potential jurors in death penalty cases targeted by prosecutors
for removal via peremptory challenge due to their attitudes con-
cerning execution.
Some portion of the 25 % of North Carolinians who oppose the
death penalty possess such strong reservations about the death
penalty that they would be excused for cause pursuant to the
140. The Supreme Court, although not directly holding that the sixth
amendment guarantees defendants the possibility of a petit jury composed of a
fair cross-section, has suggested that such is the case. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435
U.S. 223 (1978), a case:
in which there was no suggestion that the venire was improper .
[tihe Court held that the calling of only five persons from even a valid
venire to form the petit jury was inconsistent with the Sixth Amend-
ment, in part because so small a group had an unreasonably low possibil-
ity of comprising a cross-section of the community. The state was not
permitted to deal with the valid venire in a way that so limited the possi-
bility that a fair cross-section might be drawn.
McCray, 750 F.2d at 1125.
141. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
143. See supra note 5.
144. Id.
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Witherspoon and Wainwright v. Witt rationales. 145 The remaining
portion is part of the group which prosecutors target for removal
via peremptory challenges in death penalty cases. The other part
of the targeted group are those persons who are undecided as to
their opinion of execution. The "undecided" group is peremptorily
excused because the prosecutor's goal is to obtain a jury composed
only of persons who are certain they favor execution-a certainty
that persons in the "undecided" group do not possess. As a result,
the total percentage of North Carolinians in the group targeted by
prosecutors for removal via peremptory challenges in death pen-
alty cases is somewhere between 10%14I and 35%.14'
Failure to know the exact percentage of North Carolinians
who comprise the group of persons subjected to prosecutorial
abuse of the peremptory challenge is probably not fatal to a cross-
section claim. The second prong of the Duren test is not based on
exact percentages. Rather, the second prong is based on a compari-
son between members of the allegedly excluded group who are ac-
tually seated on the jury and the number of all such persons in the
community. If the comparison is "not fair and reasonable"'48 then
the second prong of the Duren test is satisfied. When a prosecutor
abuses the peremptory challenge to create a jury composed entirely
of persons favoring the death penalty, representation of the ex-
cluded group is zero. Zero representation on the jury compared to
group size in the community of between 10% and 35% is probably
not "fair and reasonable," thereby satisfying the second prong of
the Duren test.
c. Systematic Exclusion of the Group
The final prong of the Duren test requires the defendant to
show that the underrepresentation of the allegedly excluded group
"is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection
process."' 49 It is relatively clear that a prosecutor who uses his pe-
remptory challenges to exclude a certain group of persons does so
"systematically." The best evidence of this systematic practice,
short of prosecutorial admission, is most likely the voir dire tran-
145. See supra note 84.
146. This is the percentage of North Carolinians undecided about execution.
147. This is the percentage of North Carolinians who oppose execution added
to the percentage of North Carolinians who are undecided about execution.
148. Duren, 419 U.S. at 364.
149. Id.
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scripts. In an attempt to create a jury composed entirely of persons
favoring the death penalty, the prosecutor usually creates an obvi-
ous pattern of questioning centered around potential jurors' views
on the death penalty. This pattern of questioning, accompanied by
peremptory excusal by the prosecutor of a majority, if not all, po-
tential jurors indicating some degree of hesitancy concerning the
wisdom of execution, provides compelling evidence of systematic
exclusion. 150 This evidence almost certainly will satisfy the last
prong of the Duren test.
d. Shifting of the Burden of Proof
Assuming a defendant is successful in establishing a prima fa-
cie cross-section violation, the burden is shifted to the state to put
forth some significant state interest that is "manifestly and pri-
marily advanced by those aspects of the jury selection process...
that result in the disproportionate exclusion of [the] distinctive
group. ' '15 The obvious, and probably the only, justification that
can be offered by a prosecutor who has systematically excluded all
persons expressing some degree of hesitancy concerning the wis-
dom of execution is preservation of the peremptory challenge sys-
tem. However, it is doubtful that this justification is sufficient to
overcome a prima facie cross-section violation.
150. Professor Winnick argues that to be successful with such a claim, sys-
tematic excusal by prosecutors must be demonstrated over a substantial period of
time. See Winnick, supra note 12. Although such a showing would unquestionably
strengthen a defendant's argument that a prosecutor has abused peremptory chal-
lenges to create a death penalty jury composed entirely of persons favoring execu-
tion, there is some question as to the necessity for such an extensive proof show-
ing. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
151. Duren, 419 U.S. at 367-68. As noted earlier, supra note 34 and accompa-
nying text, several states and at least one federal court have modified the Duren
test when the test is applied to prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges.
These courts generally hold that "[fi]f the defendant established. . . a prima facie
case, 'the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of uncon-
stitutional action by showing that permissible . . . selection criteria and proce-
dures have produced the . . . result.'" McCray, 750 F.2d at 1132 (citation omit-
ted). "In order to rebut the defendant's showing, the prosecutor need not show a
reason rising to the level of cause." Id. "Such reasons, if they appear to be genu-
ine, should be accepted by the court, which will bear the responsibility of assess-
ing the genuineness of the prosecutor's response and of being alert to reasons that
are pretextual." Id. "If the court determines that the prosecution's presentation is
inadequate to rebut the defendant's proof, the court should declare a mistrial and
a new jury should be selected from a new panel." Id.
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Initially, preservation of the peremptory challenge as justifica-
tion for systematic excusal of a distinct group presupposes that the
peremptory challenge enjoys a position of importance somewhat
higher than constitutional rights. However, the peremptory chal-
lenge has never been required by the United States Constitu-
tion. 152 The peremptory challenge is merely a statutory creation.
As was argued earlier concerning fair and impartial constitutional
jury rights, 153 placing such great importance on the peremptory
challenge does violence to the time-tested constitutional principles
established in Marbury v. Madison,'"-that where constitutional
rights conflict with statutory rights the former must prevail.
Second, the assertion that compliance with a defendant's
cross-section rights will result in an erosion of the. peremptory
challenge system is unfounded. Both a defendant's cross-section
right and the state's interest in preserving the peremptory chal-
lenge system can be provided by adopting a McCraylWheeler type
approach 5 5 to peremptory challenge regulation. The McCray/
Wheeler type approach allows prosecutors to use peremptory chal-
lenges for virtually any reason except, of course, to eliminate cogni-
zable groups from serving on juries. Although without question the
McCray/Wheeler type approach requires a modification of the way
in which the peremptory challenge system works, the various state
and federal courts which have applied the modified version have
done so with success.'" In short, the McCraylWheeler approach
offers a less severe, more reasonable alternative to that of allowing
the state to exercise peremptory challenges for whatever purpose
regardless of a defendant's constitutional rights. 57
Finally, an argument could be made that modification of the
peremptory challenge will result in an increased burden on the ju-
dicial system. This argument is also probably unfounded. "The
[proposed] modification [of the peremptory challenge system] is
152. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Stilson v. United States, 250
U.S. 583 (1919).
153. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
154. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
155. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 36.
157. The less-prejudicial concept is common in Supreme Court decisions. For
example, in recent Supreme Court cases involving state law that encroach upon
the commerce clause of the Constitution, the Court has looked to see if there was
a less prejudicial way for the state to obtain its sought-after goals. See, e.g.,
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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required . . . only in those cases in which a defendant makes a
prima facie showing that the prosecutor has used those challenges
in a way that is inconsistent with the guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment."1 5 8 "[Tihe number of occasions in which a defendant
would be able to make out a prima facie case that the prosecutor's
use of peremptories was systematically excluding a cognizable
group from the jury solely on the basis of the group's affiliation
would be few.' ' 5 9 "It should not be considered unduly burdensome,
in those cases where a prima facie showing has been made, to scru-
tinize the prosecutor's actions when a defendant's life or liberty
may be at stake."' 06 "[TIhis limited requirement for modification
of the traditional, but nonconstitutional, system is a small price to
pay for the vindication of a constitutional right."''
2. Summary
Convincing arguments and evidence exist which strongly sug-
gest that prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges to create
death penalty juries composed entirely of persons favoring the
death penalty violates a defendant's constitutional fair cross-sec-
tion right guaranteed under the sixth amendment. State justifica-
tion for violation of this right does not appear to be of sufficient
magnitude to make the practice permissible. As a result, a convic-
tion rendered by such a jury must be overturned and a new trial
ordered. 62
C. Purpose And Function Of A Jury
A third constitutional concern created by prosecutorial abuse
of the peremptory challenge to create death penalty juries com-
posed entirely of persons favoring the death penalty is the defend-
ant's right to be tried by a jury.""3 In Duncan v. Louisiana" the
Supreme Court held that all defendants charged with "serious"
crimes have a constitutional right to be tried by a jury.
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is funda-
158. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1132.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1968).
163. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
164. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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mental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal
cases which-were they to be tried in federal court-would come
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee."6 5
The right to be tried by a "jury" is relatively meaningless un-
less the term can be adequately defined.166 Supreme Court deci-
sions struggling with the meaning of "jury" have centered around
state laws seeking to modify jury size and eliminate the need for
jury unanimity in verdicts.16 7 Although the Court has allowed sub-
stantial inroads into twelve member, unanimous verdict jury sys-
tems, the Court has refused to permit state practices which in-
fringe upon a jury's ability to perform its constitutional and
historical "purpose and function."'6 8 Where the group of persons
trying a defendant is not capable of performing the purpose and
function of a jury, a conviction rendered by that group must be set
aside. 69 This is because the defendant has not been tried by a
"jury" within the meaning of the Constitution.
In Williams v. Florida,'170 the Supreme Court was faced with
the issue of whether the State of Florida could reduce the number
of jurors in a criminal case from twelve to six. "[T]he essential fea-
ture of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the ac-
cused and his accuser of the common sense judgement of a group
of laymen, and in the community participation and shared respon-
sibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or in-
nocence."'7 1 "To be sure, the number should probably be large
165. Id. at 149.
166. For a thorough analysis of the history underlying juries see Mr. Justice
White's opinion for the Court in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
167. See, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (six person
nonunanimous verdicts do not conform to the purpose and function of a jury);
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1977) (five person juries do not conform to the
purpose and function of a jury); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (10-2 and
11-1 nonunanimous jury verdicts conform with the purpose and function of a
jury); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (9-3 nonunanimous verdicts con-
form with the purpose and function of a jury); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970) (six person unanimous jury verdicts conform with the purpose and func-
tion of a jury).
168. It is important to realize that the "purpose and function" line of Su-
preme Court decisions, although drawing heavily from cross-section analysis and
occasionally from impartiality analysis, is a separate and distinct line of cases.
169. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
170. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
171. Id. at 100.
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enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts
at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a
representative cross-section of the community. ' 172 The Court con-
cluded that the purpose and function of a jury could be provided
by six-person juries.
Nearly a decade after Williams, the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with a Georgia law that attempted to reduce jury size to
five persons. 173 The Court found the law unconstitutional because
a jury of five persons was unable to perform the purpose and func-
tion of a jury. "Not only is the representation of racial minorities
threatened in such circumstances, but also majority attitude or va-
rious minority positions may be misconstrued or misapplied
"174
[G]roup theory suggests that a person in the minority will
adhere to his position more frequently when he has at least one
other person supporting his argument .... As the number di-
minish below six, even fewer panels would have one member with
the minority viewpoint and still fewer would have two.
• ..[Wihat has just been said about the presence of minority
viewpoint as juries decrease in size foretells problems not only for
jury decision making, but also for the representation of minority
groups in the community. The Court repeatedly has held that
meaningful community participation cannot be attained with the
exclusion of minorities or other identifiable groups from jury
service." 5
Perhaps the Supreme Court's most powerful statement con-
cerning the purpose and function of a jury appeared in Brown v.
Louisiana.1 7
6
It is difficult to envision a constitutional rule that more fun-
damentally implicates "the fairness of the trial-the very integ-
rity of the fact-finding process." "The basic purpose of a trial is
the determination of truth," and it is for the jury to whom we
have entrusted the responsibility for making this determination
in serious criminal cases. Any practice that threatens the jury's
ability properly to perform that function poses a similar threat to
the truth-determination process itself.177
172. Id.
173. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223.
174. Id. at 242.
175. Id. at 236-37.
176. 447 U.S. 323 (1980).
177. Id. at 334 (citations omitted).
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Applying the purpose and function line of Supreme Court deci-
sions to juries composed entirely of persons favoring the death
penalty, it is questionable whether such juries qualify as a "jury"
within the edicts of the sixth amendment. To be sure, "meaningful
community participation' 1 8 in death penalty jury deliberations is
critically decimated, if not entirely eliminated, by a prosecutor's
peremptory removal of all persons having doubts concerning the
wisdom of the death penalty. In addition, without the participation
of this group in death penalty jury deliberations, it is doubtful
whether a jury culled of all members of this group can undergo
proper "group deliberation.1 7 9 Finally, juries composed entirely of
persons favoring the death penalty seriously run the risk that "mi-
nority positions may be misconstrued or misapplied,"' 80 if con-
strued" or applied at all. These considerations strongly suggest that
defendants convicted by such a "jury" have not been afforded a
trial by jury as guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
D. Cruel And Unusual Punishment
A fourth constitutional concern raised by prosecutorial abuse
of peremptory challenges to create death penalty juries composed
entirely of persons favoring the death penalty is that a sentence of
death rendered by such a jury may constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. The eighth amendment of the United States Consti-
tution provides, in relevant part, that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual pun-
ishment inflicted."' 8' In 1962, the Supreme Court held that these
eighth amendment guarantees are fundamental and are therefore
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 182
The mandates of the eighth amendment apply not only to the
death penalty but also to any penalty imposed by a state for viola-
tions of its laws. This latter application of eighth amendment prin-
ciples is often overlooked because the majority of recent Supreme
Court decisions interpreting "cruel and unusual punishment" have
involved death penalty issues.183 "The application of the eighth
178. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 237.
179. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
180. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 242.
181. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
182. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
183. See, e.g., Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983); Barefoot v. Estelle,
103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2268 (1982); Woodson v.
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amendment to death penalty cases must, however, be considered
apart from all other punishments.' 1 4 Mr. Justice Stewart ex-
plained this distinction quite well in Furman v. Georgia.'85
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal pun-
ishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevo-
cability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the con-
vict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our
concept of humanity. 6
Although the Supreme Court has decided numerous eighth
amendment cases, a single standard for determining what consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment has not been established.
However, an analysis of Supreme Court decisions on the death
penalty reveal a few trends. Initially, the method used by the state
to inflict the death penalty may constitute cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. 187 Second, the Court has found that the method by which
a state decides who to execute may render a death sentence cruel
and unusual. 88 Third, a death sentence may violate the Constitu-
tion because it does not conform to societal values. Commenting on
the need for community participation in death penalty sentencing
as it relates to prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges and
cruel and unusual punishment, Professor Winnick notes:
[Pirosecutorial peremptory challenge practices result in juries
that do not reflect the conscience of the community; rather, they
reflect community sentiment purged of its reluctance to impose a
death sentence. The jury selection process that produces such a
result runs a serious risk of imposing death sentences that do not
comport with society's aggregated understanding of justice. When
this risk inheres in the process of deciding which offenders de-
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
184. R. McNAMARA, CONSTITUTIONAL LmurrATIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
305 (1982).
185. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
186. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Stewart also noted that
the government's imposition of the death penalty in Furman permitted "this
unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed" that it violated the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 310.
187. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)
(state sought to impose the death penalty after its first attempt at electrocution
failed).
188. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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serve to die, capital punishment violates the eighth
amendment. "
The issue of whether prosecutorial abuse of peremptory chal-
lenges to create death penalty juries composed entirely of persons
favoring execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment be-
comes most troubling and of great concern when certain Supreme
Court language contained in Witherspoon v. Illinoiss" is ex-
amined. In Witherspoon, the Court restated its strong preference
that if the death penalty is to be imposed by a jury, the jury must
be capable of expressing the conscience of the community.19 1
"[O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform in
making . . . a selection [between life imprisonment and death] is
to maintain a link between contemporary community values and
the penal system-a link without which the determination of pun-
ishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.' ,,192 "[A] jury that
must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment
can do little more-and must do nothing less-than express the
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death. ' 19 3 However, a recent Supreme Court decision has created
some doubt as to whether this line of reasoning is still applicable.
In Spaziano v. Florida,'" the Supreme Court recently elabo-
rated on the need for community participation and societal values
in the determination of the appropriate sanction in death penalty
cases. Spaziano1 95 involved a Florida death penalty case in which
the defendant was tried by a jury and found guilty of first degree
murder. The trial court held a sentencing hearing before the same
jury, a majority of which eventually recommended life imprison-
189. Winnick, supra note 12, at 79.
190. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
191. See infra note 195 and cases cited therein.
192. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 n.15, quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958).
193. Id.
194. 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
195. Prior to Spaziano the Court had never determined whether the Consti-
tution required that a jury participate in death penalty sentence determinations.
However, the Court had strongly indicated a preference for such participation.
See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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ment. Under Florida law,196 a jury's decision concerning the pen-
alty in capital cases is merely advisory. "The trial court is to con-
duct its own weighing of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and, '[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of a
majority of the jury,' is to enter a sentence of life imprisonment or
death ... .1,,97 The trial court determined that the jury's recom-
mendation of life imprisonment was unacceptable and it therefore
ordered that the defendant be executed. Thus the Supreme Court
was faced with the rather narrow issue'98 of whether the Florida
death penalty sentencing procedure violated the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The defendant in Spaziano centered his eighth amendment
argument around recognition that the vast majority of states have
determined that "juries, not judges, are better equipped to make
reliable capital-sentencing decisions and that a jury's decision for
life should be inviolate."'9 9 The defendant argued2 00 that the rea-
son the vast majority of states leave death penalty sentencing re-
sponsibilities solely to the jury "is that the nature of the decision
whether a defendant should live or die sets capital sentencing
196. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (Supp. 1982).
197. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3158.
198. The Court noted that "we need not decide whether jury sentencing in
all capital cases is required; this case presents only the question whether, given a
jury verdict of life, the judge may override that verdict and impose death. As
counsel acknowledged at oral argument, however, his fundamental premise is that
the capital sentencing decision is one that, in all cases, should be made by a jury."
Id. at 3161.
199. At the time of Spaziano, twenty-nine jurisdictions, including North Car-
olina, allowed a death sentence only if death was recommended by the jury, un-
less, of course, the defendant waived his right to trial and/or sentencing by jury.
See Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3164-64 n.9, states and relevant statutes cited therein.
The Court noted that in "Nevada, the jury is given responsibility for imposing the
sentence in a capital case, but if the jury cannot agree, a panel of three judges
may impose the sentence." Id. "In Arizona, Idaho, Montana and Nebraska, the
court alone imposes the sentence." Id. "Besides Florida, the only States that allow
a judge to override a jury's recommendation of life are Alabama and Indiana." Id.
200. The Court pointed out that the "[pletitioner does not urge that capital
sentencing is so much like a trial on guilt or innocence that it is controlled by the
Court's decision in [Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that the
sixth amendment trial by jury right is fundamental and therefore applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.)]."
Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3161. "Nor does petitioner urge that this Court's recogni-
tion of the 'qualitative difference' of the death penalty requires the benefit of a
jury." Id. at 3162.
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apart and requires that a jury have the ultimate word." 20' The de-
fendant reasoned that "[n]oncapital sentences are imposed for va-
rious reasons, including rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deter-
rence . . . [whereas,] in contrast, the primary justification for the
death penalty is retribution.20 2 If, as the Court has repeatedly ex-
pressed, "[t]he decision that capital punishment may be the appro-
priate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the commu-
nity's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an
affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penalty of death, 2 0 3 then a jury, and not the judge, is required to
make that decision.
The imposition of the death penalty, in other words, is an expres-
sion of community outrage. Since the jury serves as the voice of
the community, the jury is in the best position to decide whether
a particular crime is so heinous that the community's response
must be death. If the answer is no, that decision should be
final.2 04
Although determining that the defendant's "argument obvi-
ously [had] . . . some appeal,21 0 5 the Court determined that the
argument was flawed in several respects. First, the Court noted
that in death penalty cases, it "has emphasized its pursuit of the
'twin objectives' of 'measured, consistent application and fairness
to the accused.' ",206
If a state has determined that death should be an available pen-
alty for certain crimes, then it must administer that penalty in a
way that can rationally distinguish between those individuals for
whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is
not. . .. It must also allow the sentencer to consider the individ-
ual circumstances of the defendant, his background, and his
crime.207
The Court concluded that "[n]othing in those twin objectives sug-
gests that the sentence must or should be imposed by a jury. '20 8
Second, the Court determined that merely because most states
201. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3163.
202. Id.
203. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976).
204. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3163.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 3162, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1982).
207. Id. at 3163 (citations omitted).
208. Id.
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place death penalty sentencing responsibilities solely with the jury,
it does not necessarily follow that states which choose not to follow
that procedure have violated the Constitution. "The fact that a
majority of jurisdictions has a different practice, however, does not
establish that contemporary standards of decency are offended by
the jury override. The Eighth Amendment is not violated every
time a state reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its
sisters over how best to administer its criminal law. '20 9
Third, the Court determined that the distinction between cap-
ital and noncapital sentences was not as clear as the defendant
contended. "While retribution clearly plays a more prominent role
in a capital case, retribution is an element of all punishments soci-
ety imposes and there is no suggestion as to any of these that the
sentence may not be imposed by a judge. '210
Finally, even accepting the defendant's contention that "the
retributive purpose behind the death penalty is the element that
sets the penalty apart, it does not follow that the sentence must be
imposed by a jury. "211
Imposing the sentence in individual cases is not the sole or even
the primary vehicle through which the community's voice can be
expressed. This Court's decisions indicate that the discretion of
the sentencing authority, whether judge or jury, must be limited
and reviewable .... The sentencer is responsible for weighing
the specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances the legisla-
ture has determined are necessary touchstones in determining
whether death is the appropriate penalty. Thus, even if it is a
jury that imposes the sentence, the "community's voice" is not
given free rein. The community's voice is heard at least as clearly
in the legislature when the death penalty is authorized and the
particular circumstances in which death is appropriate are
defined.2 12
The Court noted that it did "not denigrate the significance of
the jury's role as a link between the community and the penal sys-
tem and as a bulwark between the accused and the State. 21 3
Rather, the Court commented, "[tihe point is simply that the pur-
pose of the death penalty is not frustrated by, or inconsistent with,
209. Id. at 3164-65.
210. Id. at 3163-64.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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a scheme in which the imposition of the penalty in individual cases
is determined by a judge. 214
In concluding that the Florida law was not unconstitutional,
the Court was not convinced that putting the "responsibility on a
trial judge to impose the sentence in a capital case is so fundamen-
tally at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency
that Florida must be required to alter its scheme and give final
authority to the jury to make the life or death decision."2 15
In light of the fact that the Sixth Amendment does not require
jury sentencing, that the demands of fairness and reliability in
capital sentencing do not require it, and that neither the nature
of, nor the purpose behind, the death penalty requires jury sen-
tencing, we cannot conclude that placing responsibility on the
trial judge to impose the sentence in a capital case is
unconstitutional.21 6
1. Analysis and Applicability of Spaziano
In Spaziano, the Supreme Court reemphasized the importance
of, and indeed the continued constitutional requirement for, com-
munity participation in the determination of the appropriate pun-
ishment in death penalty cases. For many years, and presently in
the majority of states,1 meaningful community participation in
death penalty sentencing was and is thought to be provided
through use of a jury. However, the Spaziano Court established
that a jury is not the linchpin of meaningful community participa-
tion. Rather, the Court reasoned, meaningful community participa-
tion is provided when the people of a state decide through the leg-
islative process to authorize execution as a possible penalty and
when the people similarly decide under what circumstances execu-
tion will be imposed in their state. The Court determined that ap-
plication of state death penalty laws, themselves a product of com-
munity participation, could competently be performed by a judge
as well as by a jury.
It is very important to note that the Spaziano Court neither
overruled any Supreme Court decisions concerning sentencing de-
terminations by juries in death penalty cases nor did it establish
214. Id.
215. Id. at 3165.
216. Id.
217. See supra note 199.
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any new standards for such jury participation. The Court's failure
to address the jury participation issue clearly implies that prior
Court decisions relating to such participation are still good law.
Furthermore, it is one thing to say that a judge can constitu-
tionally apply community standards via state statutes and quite
another to say that a jury composed entirely of persons favoring
execution can do so. There can be no question but that not all trial
judges are capable of adequately applying death penalty sentenc-
ing statutes. For example, were a judge to disregard the statutory
framework of mitigating and aggravating factors and apply his or
her own test as to whether execution of the defendant was appro-
priate, the final decision would be unconstitutional. A second ex-
ample is where the judge is predisposed in favor of execution and
therefore disregards the unique characteristics of the particular
death penalty case. Such a situation, too, would unquestionably re-
sult in a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. It neces-
sarily follows that a judge who is incapable of applying a death
penalty sentencing statute does not provide meaningful commu-
nity participation-meaningful community participation being in
the form of the death penalty statute as was determined in Spazi-
ano. Without meaningful community participation in the sentenc-
ing process of death penalty litigation, the resulting sentence con-
stitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Applying this line of reasoning to states, such as North Caro-
lina, which leave sentencing determinations in death penalty cases
solely to juries, the same conclusion is reached. The Spaziano ra-
tionale presumes that the finder of fact is capable of fairly apply-
ing death penalty sentencing statutes and therefore of supplying
the meaningful community participation necessary to prevent the
sentence from violating the eighth amendment. However, as with
judges, since not all juries are capable of fairly applying such stat-
utes, and therefore of providing meaningful community participa-
tion, the jury must be properly composed. Improper jury composi-
tion2 18 results in the statutes being applied in a skewed manner
thereby arguable rendering community participation virtually non-
existent, much less "meaningful." Therefore, a sentence rendered
by an improperly composed jury violates the eighth amendment's
218. By "improper composition" it is meant not impartial, see supra notes
40-105 and accompanying text, not comporting with cross-section mandates, see
supra notes 106-62 and accompanying text, or not capable of performing the pur-
pose and function of a jury, see supra notes 163-80 and accompanying text.
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prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence
is void of meaningful community participation.
2. Summary
Based on Supreme Court opinions, judicial comment and
other notions of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,
executing a defendant who has been sentenced to death by a jury
composed entirely of persons favoring the death penalty arguably
violates the eighth amendment. There is substantial doubt whether
it can seriously be contended that an order of death rendered by
such a jury is the product of the "conscience of the community."2 1
Rather, it appears that such a sentence is the product of a group of
individuals, hand-picked by the prosecution because they favor the
death penalty, thereby rendering a sentence of death virtually in-
evitable. If this is the case, death sentences issued by such juries
are almost certainly being "wantonly and freakishly imposed," 2 0
resulting in cruel and unusual punishment.
E. Ethical Considerations
A final concern created by prosecutorial abuse of the peremp-
tory challenge to create death penalty juries composed entirely of
persons favoring the death penalty is whether this practice violates
legal ethics provided under the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. Although these ethical concerns do not raise constitu-
tional issues, they do present significant questions for the legal
profession and, more particularly, to prosecutors, at whom most of
the Model Code provisions set forth herein are directed.
Disciplinary Rule 8-101(A)(2) provides that "[a] lawyer who
holds public office shall not [u]se his public position to influence,
or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor of himself or of a
client."2 ' "The Disciplinary Rules . .. are mandatory in charac-
ter. [T]hey state the minimum level of conduct below which no
lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. ' 221
When a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges to create death
penalty juries composed entirely of persons who favor execution he
is arguably using his "public position" and "influence" to obtain a
219. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519; see also supra note 15.
220. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
221. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBILITy DR 8-101(A)(2) (1981).
222. Id. Preliminary Statement.
19851
49
Lindsay: Prosecutorial Abuse of Peremptory Challenges in Death Penalty Lit
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1985
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
"tribunal" calculated to "act in [his] favor."
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility also contains
Ethical Considerations. "The Ethical Considerations are aspira-
tional in character and represent the objectives toward which every
member of the [legal] profession should strive." '223 Three Ethical
Considerations should be of concern to prosecutors who abuse pe-
remptory challenges in death penalty cases to obtain juries com-
posed entirely of persons who favor execution.
First, Ethical Consideration 7-13 provides, in part, that "[tihe
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict."22'
The public prosecutor must recall that he occupies a dual role,
being obligated, on the one hand, to furnish that adversary ele-
ment essential to the informed decision of any controversy, but
being possessed, on the other, of important government powers
that are pledged to the accomplishment of one objective only,
that of impartial justice.225
It is highly questionable whether a prosecutor who uses his pe-
remptory challenges to create a death penalty case jury composed
entirely of persons favoring execution is "seeking justice." "Jus-
tice," at least in the United States and most civilized countries,
means something more that having convictions and executions de-
termined by "hanging juries '226 obviously "organized to con-
vict. '227 Even assuming that "justice" is being sought through this
type of prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges, can it rea-
sonably be asserted that such justice is "impartial?" Several socio-
logical studies, many of which have been summarized herein, 2 8 as
well as the Supreme Court's decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois,2 29
strongly suggest that this is not possible.
Second, Ethical Consideration 7-14 provides, in part, that "[a]
government lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litiga-
tion should refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is
223. Id.
224. Id. EC 7-13 (emphasis added).
225. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.
J. 1159, 1218 (1958) (emphasis added).
226. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523.
227. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294 (1947) (tribunals organized to con-
vict are unconstitutional).
228. See supra notes 47-79 and accompanying text.
229. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). See supra notes 80-105 and accompanying text.
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obviously unfair. '230 If a defendant could use his peremptory chal-
lenges to "cancel-out" the prosecutor's peremptory challenges by
challenging one potential juror favoring the death penalty for every
potential juror uncertain about the death penalty challenged by
the prosecutor, then prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory chal-
lenge might not fall to the level of "unfair." However, it is impossi-
ble statistically for a defendant faced with this situation to "can-
cel-out" the prosecutor's peremptory challenges. In North Carolina
death penalty cases both the defendant and the prosecutor are per-
mitted fourteen peremptory challenges.23' Common sense dictates
that if the defendant has fourteen peremptory challenges to elimi-
nate 65% of the jurors232 and the prosecution has fourteen pe-
remptory challenges to remove 25 % of the jurors233 that the prose-
cution enjoys a decided advantage. Not only does this appear
"unfair" but it also seems quite "obviously unfair."
Finally, Ethical Consideration 9-1 provides that
"[c]ontinuation of the American concept that we are to be gov-
erned by rules of law requires that the people have faith that jus-
tice can be obtained through our legal system. A lawyer should
promote public confidence in our system and in the legal profes-
sion. 12  To this end "[e]very lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold
the integrity and honor of his profession; to encourage respect for
the law and for the courts and the judges thereof; . ..to conduct
himself so as to reflect credit on the legal profession and to inspire
the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the public;
and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also
the appearance of impropriety."2 3 5
Prosecutors who select death penalty juries composed entirely
of persons who favor execution arguably create an appearance of
impropriety "[b]ecause the very essence of the legal system is to
provide procedures by which matters can be presented in an im-
partial manner so that they may be decided solely upon the merits
. "2 Any action by a lawyer "attempt[ing] to circumvent those
230. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1981) (emphasis
added).
231. See supra note 8.
232. See supra note 5 (percentage of North Carolinians favoring death
penalty).
233. Id. (percentage of North Carolinians opposing death penalty).
234. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-1 (1981).
235. Id. EC 9-6 (emphasis added).
236. Id. EC 9-4.
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procedures is detrimental to the legal system and tends to under-
mine public confidence in it. '2 37 We, as lawyers, and prosecutors,
as lawyers and public officials, should not loose sight of the fact
that "[i]ntegrity is the very breath of justice. Confidence in our
law, our courts, and in the administration of justice is our supreme
interest. No practice must be permitted to prevail which invites
towards the administration of justice a doubt or distrust of its in-
tegrity."' " Prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges is one
such practice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Prosecutors unquestionably serve a necessary and important
function in the criminal justice system. Unfortunately, a few prose-
cutors are engaging in questionable use of peremptory challenges
in death penalty cases. Similarly, the peremptory challenge serves
a necessary and important function in the criminal justice system.
However, when a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges to create
death penalty juries composed entirely of persons favoring execu-
tion "it would appear that the purposes of the peremptory chal-
lenge are being perverted. '"2 9
Although there is still room for debate concerning the effect of
prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges on a defendant's con-
stitutional rights, since such abuse carries severe unconstitutional
and irreversible implications, meaningful judicial review and inter-
pretation are necessary. Unfortunately, the majority of courts
faced with prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges have re-
fused to curtail the practice reasoning that the peremptory chal-
lenge is unassailable.
The recent judicial trend concerning prosecutorial abuse of pe-
remptory challenges, however, has been to shed the unassailable
theory and adopt measures that protect the defendant's constitu-
tional rights yet allow for a workable peremptory challenge system.
Virtually all judicial decisions making up this recent trend have
involved prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges to exclude
certain races-primarily blacks. However, that prosecutorial pe-
remptory exclusion of nonracial groups, such as all persons pos-
sessing some degree of hesitancy concerning the wisdom of the
237. Id.
238. Erwin M. Jennings Co. v. Di Genova, 107 Conn. 491, 499, 141 A. 866, 868
(1928).
239. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 224 (1965).
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death penalty, is a concept just appearing on the horizon of judi-
cial thought, should not denigrate the importance of defense coun-
sel raising the issue. Whenever defense counsel suspects that a
prosecutor has targeted and is removing a particular group of indi-
viduals, he or she must object on record making specific reference
to the particular constitutional provisions being violated. It is only
in this way that the appellate door to the federal judiciary will re-
main open and that one day the Supreme Court will hopefully take
the opportunity to place limitations on the abused and unbridled
prosecutorial weapon-the peremptory challenge.
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